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THE VORACIOUS FIRST AMENDMENT: 
ALVAREZ AND KNOX IN THE CONTEXT 
OF 2012 AND BEYOND 
Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein* 
          Supreme Court jurisprudence often privileges certain 
constitutional provisions to the detriment of others. Following World 
War II, the Court’s elevation of the equal protection doctrine drove 
decisions that limited the rights of states and individuals. Over the last 
twenty years, however, the First Amendment—particularly the Free 
Speech Clause—has knocked equal protection from its perch. 
          This Article analyzes United States v. Alvarez and Knox v. 
Service Employees International Union by critiquing the Court’s 
opinions, comparing these opinions to other contemporaneously 
decided cases, and situating the cases within the larger doctrinal field 
of the First Amendment. In doing so, this Article illustrates the Court’s 
systematic advancement of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. 
The Article highlights the occasionally inconsistent rationales behind 
the ascendance of the Free Speech Clause and emphasizes the cost of 
that ascendance to other societal and constitutional values, including 
labor rights, military interests, and even other clauses within the First 
Amendment. The Article concludes by underscoring the modern 
jurisprudential driving force of the First Amendment. 
 
 * Vikram David Amar is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, 
Univ. of California at UC Davis School of Law. Alan Brownstein is Professor of Law and holds 
the Boochever and Bird Chair for the Study and Teaching of Freedom and Equality, UC Davis 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court cases can be analyzed and understood in many 
different ways. Often it is helpful to examine a case on its own terms, 
within its own four corners, to see whether the assumptions are 
sound, the reasoning is solid, and the result is tenable. At other times, 
it is interesting to look at a case in relation to seemingly unrelated yet 
roughly contemporaneous cases to compare methodological 
similarities and possible inconsistencies. In yet other situations, to 
make useful sense of a case (or a group of related cases), one must 
pull back the lens and ask what the cases can tell us about the larger 
doctrinal field—its ascendancy or its marginalization—of which they 
are a part. 
In our Article for this Supreme Court issue, we examine two 
First Amendment speech cases from the 2011–2012 Term from each 
of these perspectives. In particular, we take up United States v. 
Alvarez
1
 and Knox v. Service Employees International Union.
2
 After 
describing and dissecting each of the two rulings and the various 
positions the Justices asserted in them, we compare the opinions in 
these cases to some of the other landmark rulings of the last few 
years whose reasoning seems connected to Knox and Alvarez, even 
though these other cases fall outside the First Amendment. We then 
situate Knox and Alvarez in the larger pattern of ascendancy of First 
Amendment doctrine and values over the last few decades; 
specifically, we analyze the ways in which expressive autonomy now 
seems regularly to trump competing constitutional and societal 
values that have traditionally been given great weight—somewhat in 
the same way that equal protection reasoning seemed to dominate 
constitutional analysis and balancing in the previous generation. 
A.  Alvarez 
Let us begin with United States v. Alvarez, the First Amendment 
case from last Term that seemed to garner the most headlines. 
Alvarez involved a constitutional challenge to a federal conviction 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 2. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
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under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 (SVA or “Act”).
3
 The SVA 
makes it a crime for a person to “falsely represent[] himself or 
herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration 
or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United 
States.”
4
 The Act authorizes an enhanced criminal penalty “if a 
decoration or medal involved in an offense . . . is a Congressional 
Medal of Honor.”
5
 Xavier Alvarez, a board member of a local water 
district in Southern California, began his remarks at a public meeting 
by saying: “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 
2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded a Congressional Medal of Honor. 
I got wounded many times by the same guy.”
6
 These factual 
assertions were false.
7
 Alvarez had not received any military 
decoration, much less the Medal of Honor. He had never even served 
in the Marines.
8
 
Alvarez was indicted and challenged his indictment on the 
ground that the Act violated the First Amendment.
9
 The federal 
district court rejected his challenge, after which he pleaded guilty to 
one count, reserving his right to reassert his First Amendment 
argument on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the Act unconstitutional. Over the 
dissenting votes of seven judges, the Ninth Circuit denied en banc 
review, and the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
10
 
The High Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of 
Alvarez’s conviction but could not generate a majority opinion or 
rationale for doing so; Justice Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor. Justice Breyer penned a concurring opinion joined by 
Justice Kagan, and Justice Alito wrote a dissent joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas. The Court thus broke down 4–2–3, with six 
Justices siding with Mr. Alvarez.
11
 
 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2006), invalidated by Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537. 
 4. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543 (plurality opinion). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 2542. 
 7. Id. 
 8. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200–01 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537 
(2012). 
 9. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 2541. 
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Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion began by pointing out that 
the SVA is a “content-based” law, insofar as its prohibitions turn on 
the specific content (i.e., lies about military decorations) of a 
person’s communications, and that content-based laws are usually 
subject to “exacting” judicial scrutiny.
12
 Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that various categories of unprotected or lesser-
protected speech, such as threats, fighting words, or incitement, are 
defined by their content but may nonetheless be regulated by 
legislatures under a more lenient level of judicial review. He insisted, 
however, that there is no general category of “false statements” of 
fact that receives less than full First Amendment protection.
13
 
Indeed, the plurality reaffirmed that aside from the aforementioned 
list of limited exceptions, all content-based regulations are 
“presumed invalid” and reminded that the “Court has [in the past] 
rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’ a ‘free-floating test for First 
Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of relative 
social costs and benefits.’”
14
 
Justice Kennedy conceded that some prior cases used language 
suggesting that false factual statements may fall outside the scope of 
the First Amendment.
15
 But Justice Kennedy reasoned that these 
prior opinions had really involved a narrower set of circumstances: 
when false speech caused or was likely to cause cognizable harm to 
persons other than the speaker—as in the context of defamation or 
fraud—the Court might treat falsity as a factor weighing in favor of 
government latitude to regulate such speech.
16
 But such “legally 
cognizable harm” to other persons (and, thus, such latitude) was not 
present here; Mr. Alvarez’s knowingly false statements were not 
made “to secure employment or financial benefits or admission to 
privileges reserved for those who had earned military decorations.”
17
 
Even federal statutes punishing false statements made to government 
officials, laws punishing perjury, and prohibitions against false 
representations that one is speaking on behalf of the government, 
Justice Kennedy said, involve discrete and identifiable harms—such 
 
 12. Id. at 2543–44. 
 13. Id. at 2544. 
 14. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (alterations in 
original)). 
 15. Id. at 2545. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 2542. 
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as damaging the integrity of judicial, investigatory, and other 
governmental processes; increasing the risk of mistaken court 
judgments; and undermining the “general good repute and dignity 
of . . . government . . . service itself.”
18
 However, the existence of 
these laws could not support the blanket proposition that “false 
speech should be in a general category that is presumptively 
unprotected.”
19
 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy pointed out, if government could 
regulate false statements free of constitutional constraint simply 
because they are false, then government could prohibit a wide range 
of communications—“whether shouted from the rooftops or made in 
a barely audible whisper”—on a broad list of topics.
20
 “That 
governmental power,” he asserted, “has no clear limiting 
principle.”
21
 
Applying strict scrutiny to the content-based Act, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the statute was unnecessary to protect the 
integrity of federally conferred medals (even if that goal is an 
overriding or compelling governmental objective) because the 
constitutionally preferred remedy for bad, false speech is good, true 
speech.
22
 In the case of the SVA, for example, private people and the 
government alike can, with their own speech, expose those who lie 
about earning military medals as the scoundrels they are.
23
 
Importantly, as Justice Kennedy explained, a “Government-created 
[and presumably publicly accessible] database could list” Medal of 
Honor recipients.
24
 To the extent that such counterspeech would be 
ineffective because “some military records have been lost,” the 
plurality reasoned, criminal prosecution would also be ineffective, 
since prosecution without “verifiable records . . . would be more 
difficult . . . . So, in cases where public refutation will not serve the 
Government’s interest, the Act will not either.”
25
 Since there are less 
restrictive means than criminally prosecuting liars to accomplish the 
 
 18. Id. at 2546 (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943) (alteration in 
original)). 
 19. Id. at 2546–47. 
 20. Id. at 2547. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 2550–51. 
 23. Id. at 2549–50. 
 24. Id. at 2551. 
 25. Id. at 2550. 
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government’s interest of preserving the integrity of military honors, 
the SVA failed strict scrutiny.
26
 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence was far less conventional than 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Breyer never mentioned, let alone 
emphasized, that the Act was content-based. Instead, his opinion was 
written as if there were no formal free speech doctrine currently in 
use that constrains judges’ assessments of free speech claims. 
Without recognizing any doctrinal categories, he observed that courts 
in free speech cases generally consider the interests of the speaker in 
freely communicating a message, the justifications that the 
government advances for impairing freedom of speech, and the 
alternatives available to the government to accomplish its goals.
27
 
Sometimes, after considering all of these factors, judicial review 
requires either a near-automatic invalidation of a law (under strict 
scrutiny), a near-automatic upholding of the law (under minimum 
rationality/“rational basis review”), or some form of proportionality 
analysis or intermediate level scrutiny.
28
 
According to Justice Breyer and his free-form balancing 
approach, the SVA should receive intermediate scrutiny because (1) 
the harm to speakers here (i.e., the extent to which the Act creates a 
“chilling effect” inhibiting valuable speech) is limited insofar as the 
veracity of the speech in question—the factual assertion that the 
speaker has received a military decoration—is easily verifiable and 
does not involve contested matters of philosophy, religion, history, 
politics, or the like; (2) false assertions of fact contribute less to the 
marketplace of ideas than do true assertions of fact; and (3) 
government often has a good reason to prohibit false assertions of 
fact.
29
 
Although intermediate scrutiny is not “strict,” neither is it 
toothless, and Justice Breyer concluded that the Act could not 
survive this standard of review.
30
 In reaching this conclusion, Justice 
Breyer expressed concern about the statute’s breadth and 
recommended the enactment of a more finely tailored statute, 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 28. Id. at 2551–52. 
 29. Id. at 2552. 
 30. Id. at 2556. 
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perhaps one that required specific proof of harm to others or at least 
a particular likelihood of harm.
31
 
Justice Alito’s dissent began, naturally enough, from doctrinal 
pole directly opposite from that of the plurality.
32
 The dissent (like 
the concurrence) barely mentioned that the Act is content 
discriminatory; instead, what was essential to Justice Alito was that 
the statute was limited to knowingly false statements of facts, lies 
about facts that are directly within the speaker’s personal 
knowledge.
33
 Such lies, the dissent argued, have no value and are 
thus not protected by the First Amendment.
34
 Therefore, the Act, in 
Justice Alito’s view, should easily be upheld as constitutional.
35
 
What about other possible statutes that might regulate other 
kinds of lies in ways, and to an extent, that would have more 
problematic consequences? Justice Alito recognized that government 
prohibitions of some lies might also “chill” and suppress protected 
speech that is not false.
36
 In such cases, he said the Court should 
review the prohibition rigorously, even though lies have no First 
Amendment value themselves, for prophylactic reasons—that is, 
because of the law’s impact on protected speech.
37
 
Finally, the dissent responded to the “slippery slope” concern 
that if lies are treated as unprotected speech, the government might 
prohibit lying on an endless list of subjects—such as lying about 
college records, achievement or prowess in the arts or athletics, etc.
38
 
The dissent argued that such legislative abuses would be unlikely to 
occur and in any case would be corrected by the political process: 
“The safeguard against such laws is democracy, not the First 
Amendment. Not every foolish law is unconstitutional.”
39
 
One overriding problem with all three of the opinions that were 
issued in Alvarez is that they do not really provide a clear answer to 
the key question that the case presented: How should the First 
Amendment treat factual lies?
40
 Certainly, if we look at the Justices’ 
 
 31. Id. at 2553–56. 
 32. See id. at 2556–57 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 2557. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 2563–64. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. at 2565. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 2539 (plurality opinion). 
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writings collectively, we have no clear resolution of that question, in 
part because there was no majority opinion. But more troubling still, 
even if the nine Justices were to rally around one of the three 
approaches offered in their various opinions, there would still be no 
coherent resolution of the status the First Amendment affords false 
factual assertions. Why? Because none of the three frameworks 
really identifies a workable approach to dealing with false assertions 
as a general matter. 
In other words, the lack of clarity in Alvarez results not just from 
the Court’s fragmentation, but also from the fuzzy and incomplete 
quality of the analysis in each of the opinions. Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion differentiated between harm-causing lies and non-harm-
causing lies as a basis for holding that strict scrutiny governs the 
review of the SVA.
41
 But this is a very ambiguous distinction—who 
knows what type or magnitude of harm would suffice to remove a 
statute from strict scrutiny under the plurality’s approach? Why, 
precisely, is the possible devaluation of military medals—the 
concern that motivated Congress to enact the SVA—not a cognizable 
or serious enough harm? 
Relatedly, Justice Kennedy conceded that whether the regulated 
speech is a lie may often be relevant to the First Amendment 
analysis, but he does not say how it is relevant.
42
 Indeed, he does not 
seem even to formally take the falsity of the prohibited speech into 
account in his application of strict scrutiny to the Act.
43
 Finally, 
Justice Kennedy does not clarify how the regulation of lies that do 
(in his judgment) cause harm should be evaluated.
44
 Do laws 
regulating lies ever warrant strict scrutiny? If they warrant some 
lower level of scrutiny, what level of review should courts apply? 
For example, state law regimes for regulating defamation do not 
seem to map onto the strict/intermediate/rational basis scrutiny grid 
very well, and yet Justice Kennedy never tries to harmonize his 
approach in the SVA case with the First Amendment’s general 
treatment of lies in the defamation context. 
The primary problem with Justice Breyer’s invocation of 
intermediate scrutiny to review the SVA’s prohibition of false 
 
 41. See id. at 2542–51. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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statements of fact is that the trigger for invoking that scrutiny seems 
so nebulous. The big knock on intermediate scrutiny generally is that 
it is too malleable and indeterminate in its application. If the very 
basis for invoking it is also a malleable and indeterminate amalgam 
of factors (Justice Breyer’s opinion offers only vague intuitions 
about the value of particular speech and the generally good reasons 
government might have to regulate it as the basis for applying 
intermediate level scrutiny to the SVA), then the problem of 
subjectivity and unpredictability is exacerbated. 
To be clear, we do not necessarily oppose subjecting laws 
restricting false statements of fact to intermediate scrutiny. If that 
approach is to be adopted, however, such scrutiny should apply to 
the entire category of such laws, not just laws directed at those false 
statements that strike Justice Breyer as being of particularly low 
value, or not just laws that Justice Breyer thinks further important 
government interests. In other words, categories and categorical 
analysis have served free speech values well, and abandoning 
categories in favor of an unstructured, ad hoc assessment of the kind 
that Justice Breyer undertakes is problematic (even if Justice Breyer 
would end up upholding and striking down most of the same laws we 
would under a more structured approach). 
The dissent’s position has problems of its own. It asserts that all 
lies are unprotected speech and do not really implicate the First 
Amendment unless their prohibition does in fact chill protected 
speech. But what happens if regulation of lies does chill protected 
speech? Should strict scrutiny apply? Courts do not generally 
perform a strict scrutiny analysis in the context of defamation, where 
the primary free speech concern is about chilling effects. Thus, like 
the other opinions, the dissent does not adequately locate this dispute 
about false facts in the larger setting of cases—including defamation 
cases—in which the Court has grappled with false assertions of fact. 
Also, the dissent provides no limiting principle for the review of 
regulations of lies that do not chill protected speech.
45
 The only 
check on such laws would then be political accountability, but that is 
not an adequate response for many folks when freedom of speech is 
at issue. 
 
 45. Id. at 2556–65 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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B.  Knox 
The First Amendment claim in Knox is quite different from that 
involved in Alvarez. In Knox, nonunion state employees invoked the 
First Amendment to challenge the way California structures its 
relationship with public-sector employee unions.
46
 In California, as 
in many other states, a public-sector bargaining unit may, by 
majority vote, elect to create an “agency shop” in which the union is 
the collective bargaining agent on behalf of all the employees. 
Employees in the unit, whether or not they choose to become full-
fledged union members (and they have a choice not to), must pay an 
“annual fee to cover the cost of union services related to collective 
bargaining (so-called chargeable services).”
47
 Such chargeable 
services do not, and cannot, however, include expenses incurred to 
fund the union’s political or ideological projects.
48
 In Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education,
49
 and then again in Chicago Teachers 
Union v. Hudson,
50
 the Court held that the First Amendment 
prohibits states from forcing public-sector employees to pay for a 
union’s ideological or political activities (as distinguished from the 
union’s collective bargaining activities), because some employees 
may disagree with the union’s politics.
51
 
Knox focuses on the procedure by which employees who do not 
want to pay for a union’s ideological activities can prevent their 
contributions to the union from being used for political purposes.
52
 
The actual legal dispute in Knox arose out of an unusual scenario in 
which the union not only assessed employees for its regular annual 
fee but levied an additional, midyear fee on employees as well.
53
 In 
June 2005, the affected public-sector union sent its annual fee notice 
to all employees within the unit.
54
 Consistent with procedures set 
forth in Hudson, the union estimated that 56 percent of its projected 
outlays during the coming year would involve so-called “chargeable” 
expenses—that is, expenses related to collective bargaining and other 
 
 46. See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 50. 475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 51. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2284–85. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2301 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 2285 (majority opinion). 
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nonpolitical core union activities for which even nonmember 
employees could be required to contribute.
55
 This 56 percent estimate 
was based on the actual experience during the previous year. To the 
extent that a particular year’s (call it “Year One’s”) estimate of 
chargeable expenses is higher than actual expenses end up being, the 
following year’s (“Year Two’s”) estimate will be lower because it 
will be based on the actual expenditures incurred in Year One, 
determined by an audit at the end of Year One. Although this system 
involves some imprecision, insofar as employees are (in hindsight) 
sometimes billed too much and at other times billed too little for a 
particular year, the Court has permitted this rough-and-ready 
approach because predicting actual expenditures and allocations with 
complete accuracy is impossible.
56
 
Pursuant to the notice required under Hudson (called a “Hudson 
notice”) that went out in June, employees who wished not to pay the 
44 percent of the total fee amount attributable to expected political 
expenses had thirty days to object, and if they met this deadline, they 
would have to pay only 56 percent of the total union fees. The fee 
notice said that fees were subject to increase without further notice.
57
 
After the thirty-day objection period had lapsed, the union sent 
out another fee notice, proposing a temporary (that is, one-year ) 25 
percent increase in employee dues, which the union titled an 
“Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back 
Fund.”
58
 The proposal stated that union needed the money to “help 
achieve the union’s political objectives in the special election and the 
upcoming November 2006 election.”
59
 The proposal specifically 
stated that the monies raised by the “temporary” 25 percent increase 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 2301 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. The special election involved, in particular, two contentious ballot measures: 
Propositions 75 and 76. Id. at 2285 (majority opinion). Ironically, “Proposition 75 would have 
required unions to obtain employees’ affirmative consent before charging them fees to be used for 
political purposes.” Id. “Proposition 76 would have limited state spending and would have given 
the Governor the ability under some circumstances to reduce state appropriations for public-
employee compensation.” Id. The union vigorously opposed both propositions. Id. Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger had called for the special election within which Propositions 75 and 76 
were ballot initiatives. Id. Accordingly, with respect to the upcoming November 2006 
gubernatorial election, the union’s goal was “to elect a governor and a legislature who support 
public employees and the services [they] provide.” Id. at 2286 (alteration in original). 
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in dues would be used “for a broad range of political expenses”
60
 and 
not to fund “regular costs of the union.”
61
 Less than thirty days after 
the proposed one-year increase, the union’s general counsel 
implemented it.
62
 
Employees who were not members of the union (“nonmember 
employees”) were not given the choice of whether to pay the 25 
percent increase in dues,
63
 although the union subsequently permitted 
nonmember employees who had filed timely objections in response 
to the June 2005 Hudson notice to pay only 56 percent of the one-
year “emergency” assessment. Nonmember employees who opposed 
having to pay this assessment to support the union’s “Political Fight-
Back Fund” formed a class and sued.
64
 Those nonmember employees 
who had filed objections to the June 2005 notice argued they should 
not have to pay even 56 percent of the temporary assessment because 
the entirety of the new assessment was intended to be used for 
political, and thus nonchargeable, expenses.
65
 Those employees who 
had not filed objections to, and thus paid the entirety of, the annual 
dues levied in June 2005 argued that they should have been given a 
separate chance to object to the political expenditures contemplated 
by the new assessment. Their argument was based in part on the 
notion that their failure to opt out of paying the nonchargeable part of 
the regular annual assessment did not necessarily indicate agreement 
with the union’s plans concerning the political use to which the 
special fund levy was going to be put.
66
 The district court ruled in the 
plaintiffs’ favor, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the plaintiffs sought 
and obtained Supreme Court review.
67
 
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the union offered to 
provide refunds to all members of the plaintiff class.
68
 As a result, 
the first question the Court had to resolve was whether the dispute 
had been rendered moot by virtue of the union’s offer.
69
 The Court 
rejected the notion that the dispute was moot, observing that 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 2286. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 2286–87. 
 68. Id. at 2287. 
 69. Id. 
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“postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from 
review in this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.”
70
 The Court 
also reasoned that the case remained live because the union’s refund 
notice was allegedly chock-full of “conditions, caveats and 
confusions . . . aimed at reducing the number of class members who 
claim a refund.”
71
 Because “the nature of the notice may affect how 
many employees who object to the union’s special assessment would 
be able to get their money back,” and because “[t]he union was not 
entitled to dictate unilaterally the manner in which it [was legally 
obligated to] advertise[] the availability of the refund,”
72
 the 
controversy had not died. 
Turning to the merits, seven Justices concluded that the 
plaintiffs should prevail on their two primary arguments. First, the 
Court concluded that employees who had objected in June 2005 
should not have had to pay any of the special assessment because the 
entire special assessment was being used for nonchargeable matters. 
Second, the Court concluded that employees who had not objected in 
June 2005 should have been given a separate opportunity to object 
the special assessment because the anticipated political expenditures 
connected with the special fund might generate disagreement among 
at least some of the employees who initially did not opt out of full 
payment of the regular annual dues.
73
 In summary, the Court 
concluded that “when a [public] union levies a special assessment or 
dues increase to fund political activities [only], the union may not 
collect funds from nonmembers who earlier had objected to the 
payment of nonchargeable expenses, and may not collect funds from 
other nonmembers without providing a new Hudson notice and 
opportunity to opt out.”
74
 
Two members of the Court, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, 
would have limited the holding to the above conclusion.
75
 Yet five 
other Justices who agreed with the Court’s judgment—Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas—went 
further in holding that “when a public-sector union imposes a special 
assessment or dues increase, [it] may not exact any funds from 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 2293. 
 74. Id. at 2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 2296. 
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nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”
76
 In other words, in 
addition to providing notice, the union must receive a nonmember’s 
affirmative consent to opt in before the union can compel special 
assessments; the union may not simply rely on the nonmember’s 
silence or failure to opt out as a basis for collecting the special 
assessment. 
The majority’s rationale, if accepted, could call into question the 
union’s use of an opt-out, rather than an opt-in, approach as applied 
to annual, nonchargeable dues as well; nothing in the majority 
opinion explained why an opt-in procedure is constitutionally 
required for special assessments but would not be required for annual 
assessments. The majority did say that the union’s position would 
have required the Court to “go farther” than past cases
77
—which had 
authorized use of an opt-out procedure for annual dues—but it also 
said that these past cases “approach, if they do not cross, the limit of 
what the First Amendment can tolerate.”
78
 
More ambitiously still, the majority seemed to raise some 
questions about whether a public union could compel nonmembers to 
pay even chargeable expenses related to collective bargaining.
79
 The 
majority stated that forcing nonmembers to pay anything at all 
“represent[s] an ‘impingement’ on [their] First Amendment rights.”
80
 
The Court went on to state that the “primary purpose”
81
 of allowing 
unions to collect fees from nonmembers—the desire “to prevent 
nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing the 
employment benefits obtained by the union’s collective bargaining 
without sharing the costs incurred”—is one that is “generally 
insufficient to overcome First Amendment concerns”
82
 and that cases 
upholding the requirement that nonmembers pay for chargeable 
expenses “represents something of an anomaly.”
83
 Nonetheless, the 
majority said it was not going to “revisit today whether the Court’s 
 
 76. Id. (majority opinion). 
 77. Id. at 2291. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 2293. 
 80. Id. at 2284. 
 81. Id. at 2289. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2290. 
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former cases have given adequate recognition to the critical First 
Amendment rights at stake.”
84
 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, indicated 
that he would have upheld the union’s actions in this case.
85
 Like the 
two concurring Justices, he chided the majority for reaching out and 
speaking on the important opt-out versus opt-in question for special 
assessments (and perhaps also for annual dues) given that that issue 
had not been fully argued.
86
 He also concluded that the objecting 
nonmembers had no legitimate gripe at all in this case (even though 
they had not been permitted to opt out of nonchargeable expenses 
associated with the special assessment), largely because of the 
union’s need to operate efficiently.
87
 True, the union’s mode of 
collecting monies from members and nonmembers and allowing 
nonmembers to opt out of nonchargeable expenses just once a year 
may result in some objectors having their monies used temporarily 
for political purposes with which they disagree. Such imperfections, 
however, are offset by the system’s “administrative virtue”
88
 and 
efficiency for the union and for workers. By basing each year’s 
assessment on the previous year’s allocation track record, even 
though the previous year may be an imperfect predictor of the 
present year, and by limiting the time window during which 
individuals can opt out , the system in place gives “workers reliable 
information [and] advance notice of next year’s payable charge.”
89
 It 
also “gives nonmembers a ‘reasonably prompt’ opportunity to 
object”
90
 and frees the union from having to predict with great 
accuracy what the next year’s outlays will look like. 
 
 84. Id. at 2289. 
 85. Id. at 2299 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 2306. 
 87. See id. at 2301. 
 88. Id. (“Normally, what the objecting nonmembers lose on the swings they will gain on the 
roundabouts.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 2301–02. 
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II.  ALVAREZ AND KNOX IN RELATION TO 
OTHER MAJOR RULINGS OF RECENT YEARS 
IN DIFFERENT DOCTRINAL AREAS 
A.  A “Slippery” Summer Day 
The Alvarez opinion was handed down on June 28, 2012 the 
very same day as the opinion in the year’s most-watched case: 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
91
 which 
addressed the challenges to Obamacare.
92
 Sebelius cast large 
shadows over everything else in the Term that it dominated. Indeed, 
it is not an exaggeration to say that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
dispute was—in terms of the number of people affected, the amount 
of money involved, and the symbolic, political, and institutional 
stakes on the line—bigger than all the other seventy-some cases the 
Court decided this year put together.
93
 
The Court issued many holdings in Sebelius, one of which was 
that the Commerce Clause could not be a valid basis for 
Obamacare’s so-called “individual mandate” provision because 
Congress was requiring participation in, rather than “regulating,” 
commercial activity.
94
 No one seemed to doubt that the healthcare 
and healthcare insurance markets involved true interstate commercial 
problems.
95
 After all, insurance and healthcare providers are usually 
national, or at least regional, operations. Quite regularly, folks who 
cross state lines get sick and must be cared for away from home, and 
people are often unable to relocate to another state for fear of losing 
their employer-based coverage. Nor did anyone really dispute that 
the individual mandate was sincerely motivated by, and closely 
related to, the regulation of these interstate markets and interstate 
 
 91. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 92. Id. This Supreme Court issue contains two articles that discuss Sebelius in depth. Brietta 
Clark, Safeguarding Federalism by Saving Health Reform: Implications of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 541 (2013); Jonathan D. Varat, Supreme 
Court Foreword, October Term 2011: Federalism Points and the Sometime Recognition of 
Essential Federal Power, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 93. Vikram David Amar & Akhil Reed Amar, Chief Justice Roberts Reaches for Greatness, 
L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/01/opinion/la-oe-amar-roberts-
supreme-court-20120701. 
 94. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–48 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 95. See id. at 2572–77 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
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spillover effects.
96
 Those two conclusions would ordinarily be 
sufficient to justify the exercise of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
97
 
But the problem, suggested by Chief Justice Roberts and the 
four Justices (Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) in the 
joint dissent, was the slippery slope they saw in a congressional 
mandate requiring individuals to buy something.
98
 It raised red flags 
that Congress was not just regulating existing commercial 
transactions, but rather compelling previously inactive individuals to 
engage in commercial activity.
99
 If the federal government can 
require each person to buy health insurance, what can’t it force 
people to purchase? Both at oral argument and in their opinions, 
these Justices seemed worried: Would Congress also be able to force 
people to buy cell phones, broccoli, or burial services?
100
 If the Court 
were to permit Congress to compel people to purchase goods or 
services, the resulting freefall would have only one conceivable 
endpoint—a world in which there are no limits to the federal 
government’s Commerce Clause power to regulate the lives of all 
Americans.
101
 
This slippery slope concern did not originate at oral argument. 
As one prominent challenger to the ACA, Randy Barnett, had put the 
point in an earlier essay: 
Congress can mandate individuals do virtually anything at 
all on the grounds that the failure to engage in economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Therefore, [a theory that permits the healthcare law] would 
effectively obliterate, once and for all, the enumerated 
 
 96. Vikram David Amar, Obamacare and the Misguided Criticism of “Liberal Law 
Professors” Who Defend It, JUSTIA (June 7, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/07/ 
obamacare-and-the-misguided-criticism-of-liberal-law-professors-who-defend-it. 
 97. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 98. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–44 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 2587 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2643–44 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & 
Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 100. Id. at 2591 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal 
citation omitted) (“Underlying the Chief Justice’s view that the Commerce Clause must be 
confined to the regulation of active participants in a commercial market is a fear that the 
commerce power would otherwise know no limits. The joint dissenters express a similar 
apprehension.”). 
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powers scheme that even the New Deal Court did not 
abandon.
102
 
We understand the need for courts to have adequate doctrinal 
tools available to keep Congress within some constitutional bounds 
in exercising its Commerce Clause power or other national powers 
recognized by the Constitution. But while we think courts should not 
abdicate a robust role in policing the boundaries of federalism, we 
also think that judges should use tools that are of the right shape and 
size for the job. And as we have written before,
103
 we are struck by 
the fact that in the dispute over the mandate, none of the Justices in 
the majority even acknowledged, let alone dealt with, the fact that 
constitutional doctrine is already poised on equally treacherous 
slopes in interpreting the Commerce Clause, and that the Court has 
demonstrated that it has plenty of pitons available to arrest any slide 
into the abyss of limitless federal power. The slippery slope danger 
has been present in Commerce Clause doctrine for the past fifty 
years,
104
 and the mandate does not create additional slopes that are 
any more dangerous than those the Court has already been dealing 
with for decades. In other words, there is no persuasive basis for 
thinking that the individual mandate will create a steeper or more 
slippery slope—one that is less susceptible to judicial or political 
handholds and footholds—than those hazards we live with that exist 
under current doctrine. 
To understand this point, it is useful to remember that the Court 
has already determined that Congress has the authority to prohibit 
people from possessing things under the Commerce Clause.
105
 Just 
seven years ago in Gonzales v. Raich,
106
 the Court held that the 
federal government can ban the possession of marijuana.
107
 It did not 
matter in Raich how a person obtained the marijuana, how much he 
 
 102. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance 
Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 607 (2010). 
 103. See, e.g., Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Not-So-Slippery Slope, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2012, at A19; Vikram David Amar, The High Court Needn’t Worry About Sliding Downhill, 
JUSTIA (Apr. 11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/04/11/the-high-court-neednt-worry-about-
sliding-downhill. 
 104. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2616–17, 2619 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (describing the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause and its 
ability to regulate current conduct based on anticipated future activity). 
 105. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 106. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 107. Id. at 9. 
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or she possessed, or whether he or she planned to consume it rather 
than sell it. Possession itself was punishable.
108
 
As we observed before the Sebelius ruling came down (and as 
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissenting opinion in Sebelius),
109
 the 
holding in Raich would seem to put us on hazardous ground. Does 
Raich mean that Congress can also ban the possession of cars, 
televisions, clothes, the tomatoes you grow in your garden, or the 
broccoli in your refrigerator? If the federal government can ban the 
possession of all goods, hasn’t it become all powerful? 
The Court has provided some answers to that question already, 
by denying the premise. Even though the federal government might 
ban possession of some things at some times, the government’s 
power in this regard is not unlimited.
110
 As Justice Scalia observed in 
his concurring opinion in Raich, the possession of marijuana in 
particular can be punished because such penalties are necessary to 
carry out a comprehensive regulatory scheme—the Controlled 
Substances Act—that governs a robust and interstate market in 
drugs.
111
 Without that comprehensive regulatory scheme as an 
anchor and a clear tie-line connecting the ban on possession to the 
regulation of the market in illicit drugs, the ban on marijuana 
possession would exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
112
 
Of course, such an argument cuts in favor of, not against, the 
individual mandate in the healthcare reform law. The ACA is a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing interstate commerce, 
and the individual mandate plays an important role in furthering that 
regulatory framework. In other words, upholding the mandate in the 
ACA does not mean upholding any and every random, hypothetical 
mandate a crazy Congress might enact, even assuming that such a 
rogue Congress could survive in office. 
Consider another example: No one doubts that under current 
doctrine the government can often regulate ongoing economic 
activity—the sale and purchase of goods and services. Once people 
enter commerce as producers, sellers, or buyers, the government can 
 
 108. Id. at 22. 
 109. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(observing that “[w]hen contemplated in its extreme, almost any power looks dangerous”). 
 110. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 35–36 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 111. Id. at 39–40. 
 112. Id. 
  
Winter 2013] VORACIOUS FIRST AMENDMENT 511 
regulate their economic transactions and activities. This authority is 
widely accepted. But think about the slippery slopes it creates. 
Let us return to broccoli, the commodity of choice during the 
oral arguments. Congress might, instead of requiring the purchase 
and consumption of broccoli, try to prohibit grocery stores from 
selling any vegetable—or even any food—other than broccoli. Or it 
might require people to purchase broccoli as a condition of 
purchasing other food, or other goods or services. Can Congress pull 
us down this cliff? If so, then who cares whether Congress can 
compel specific purchases to be made directly? It can effectively 
compel people to buy designated goods by regulating or prohibiting 
consumer decisions to purchase other things. 
Happily, we do not think the American people have cause for 
serious concern here either. Some commercial regulations would 
lack the constitutionally required minimal rationality. In the 
extremely unlikely event that Congress conditioned the purchase of, 
say, cars on the purchase of broccoli, the law would fail even a 
deferential rational basis review by courts. Moreover, some 
connections between a particular piece of a law and the larger 
comprehensive scheme regulating commerce that justifies 
congressional attention in the first place are simply too attenuated to 
be upheld as constitutional. 
The key point here is that these slippery slopes already exist. We 
have been standing on them for years under long-accepted 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, and we have held our 
position without tumbling into the crevasse of unlimited federal 
regulatory authority.
113
 
 
 113. None of this is to say that attenuation is the only device the Court has—or should have—
to keep Congress in check. Not all congressional mandates are constitutionally permissible 
simply because they advance some otherwise legitimate federal goal in a direct and non-
attenuated way. The Constitution itself, in some of its provisions and doctrines, prevents 
Congress from coercing certain kinds of action. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of 
troops in private homes during peacetime, the Fifth Amendment prevents government from 
mandating self-incrimination and the surrender of property without just compensation, and the 
First Amendment prohibits government from mandating that individuals be vessels for 
government speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I, III. The Supreme Court has held in the so-called 
anticommandeering cases, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 145 (1992), and Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 900 (1997), that federalism principles prohibit Congress from 
mandating that state governments exercise their regulatory power on behalf of federal goals. On 
the other hand, the federal government can mandate taxes and jury and military service, among 
other things, even if the individuals so mandated are not doing anything that serves as the 
predicate for being subject to such mandates. See Vikram Amar, Assessing the Reasoning of the 
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Given that they failed to address, let alone refute, the strong 
arguments against an asserted slippery slope problem in Sebelius, the 
five Justices in the Commerce Clause majority might be expected to 
be very open to embracing meaningful slippery slope arguments in 
other cases. And yet in Alvarez, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas 
(60 percent of the Obamacare Commerce Clause majority) have 
virtually nothing to say to the other Justices who (plausibly) wonder 
where Congress’s power to proscribe false statements would end if, 
as the dissent insisted, all lies are unprotected speech. The dissent in 
Alvarez merely states: 
This concern is likely unfounded. With very good reason, 
military honors have traditionally been regarded as quite 
different from civilian awards . . . . In any event, if the 
plurality’s concern is not entirely fanciful, it falls outside 
the purview of the First Amendment . . . . The safeguard 
against such laws is democracy, not the First Amendment. 
Not every foolish law is unconstitutional.
114
 
Now we ask: Is a law proscribing additional categories of false 
statements (if false statements are held to be outside the 
Constitution’s protection) more or less likely to be enacted than a 
law requiring the purchase of broccoli or many other goods and 
services (if the federal government’s power were to be upheld in the 
Obamacare cases under the Commerce Clause)? Justice Alito’s 
dissent in Alvarez states that legislatures have traditionally regarded 
military awards as special.
115
 But recent federal and state history 
suggest that legislatures also view the way the healthcare and health 
 
Eleventh Circuit Opinion Striking Down Obamacare, JUSTIA VERDICT (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/08/19. The question then becomes, when is a mandate that would in 
fact promote a legitimate end nonetheless be constitutionally problematic? Although no simple 
line can be drawn to connect all the dots, it is noteworthy that with respect to those mandates that 
are acknowledged to be constitutionally impermissible, generally speaking, the individual or 
entity being mandated is not contributing to the problem Congress is trying to solve in any 
distinctive way, or in a way that explains the extent of the mandate. For example, in the anti-
commandeering cases, the states that were commandeered were themselves not in any way 
standing as an obstacle to Congress’s ability to otherwise implement its regulatory objectives. See 
Amar, supra note 113. They were, simply put, not part of the problem Congress was trying to fix, 
but instead had simply declined to be the solution that Congress wanted them to be. The free 
riders to whom the Obamacare mandate was directed are not outside bystanders to the problem 
that the government seeks to solve. They are part of the problem. 
 114. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2565 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 2557–58. 
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insurance markets operate as special. (Indeed, the Court so held in 
the Medicaid portions of the ruling.)
116
 
If legislatures do begin to go down the slippery slope in either 
context, which slide would be harder to stop? As noted above, in the 
Commerce Clause setting, the Court has already developed tools—
like the requirement of comprehensive regulation of a true interstate 
market to which the law in question is proximately related—to arrest 
inevitable freefall. Where are the similar ropes and cables in First 
Amendment doctrine once heightened scrutiny of any rigor is 
rejected (as the dissent would have it)? The dissenters in Alvarez 
point to political checks against government abuse, but is there 
reason to think that additional punishments of false speech are likely 
to generate more intense and broad-based political blowback than 
would congressional requirements mandating more purchases by 
consumers? 
An obsession with complete consistency may be the hobgoblin 
of little minds, but flagrantly inconsistent methodology in major 
cases decided the same day cannot be the answer either. 
B.  Of Free Riding, Manipulative Mootness, and Union Clout 
Knox preceded Alvarez and Sebelius by a week, but it too shared 
deep methodological connections with the healthcare ruling. We 
focus here on the part of the majority opinion in Knox suggesting that 
nonmember employees may very well have a winning First 
Amendment argument against forced payment of even so-called 
chargeable expenses—those relating to the collective-bargaining 
activities by the union that presumably improve wages, benefits, and 
working conditions for all employees. The same concern about 
deterring free riders lay at the heart of the so-called mandate 
provision in the ACA; individuals who knew that insurance 
companies could not reject their applications for policies after the 
onset of sickness or injury, because of the ACA’s ban on so-called 
preexisting condition discrimination, would have every incentive to 
 
 116. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (“We have no need 
to fix a line. . . . It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond 
it.”); see also id. at 2661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The question whether a law enacted under 
the spending power is coercive in fact will sometimes be difficult, but where Congress has plainly 
‘crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion,’ . . . a federal program that coopts 
the States’ political processes must be declared unconstitutional.”). 
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wait until they had serious health problems before obtaining 
coverage and paying premiums.
117
 
It is important to recognize that in both these cases, the Court’s 
concerns with the government’s attempts to resolve these problems 
are limited to those situations in which the government acts through 
private agents and businesses to further public goals. There is no 
Commerce Clause issue when government extends Medicare or 
creates some other public healthcare system and taxes the general 
public to support it. Nor does the First Amendment prohibit 
government from exacting fees or taxes from employees—even if 
those funds are eventually used by government to subsidize unions’ 
collective bargaining efforts.
118
 
As Professor Mike Dorf has explained crisply, there is a 
similarity between the reasoning in Knox and Sebelius, but one that is 
troubling: 
The five Justices in the Knox majority were the same five 
who voted that the Affordable Care Act’s so-called 
individual mandate could not be sustained under the 
Commerce Clause because Congress supposedly lacks the 
authority to mandate purchases of insurance in the private 
sector . . . . 
. . . In Knox, the majority hinted that in the future, it 
may invoke the First Amendment to deny government the 
ability to authorize agency shops in which unions charge 
non-members for free-riding on their bargaining activities. 
In the health care case, the same five conservative Justices 
(including Chief Justice Roberts, on this point), said that the 
Commerce Clause forbade Congress from mandating 
health-insurance purchases as a means of preventing 
currently healthy people from free-riding on the premiums 
that are being paid by others who now have insurance. 
 
 117. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012); see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119 (2011). 
 118. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (“Citizens may challenge 
compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government 
speech.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 258 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Justice Powell in Abood explained that in First Amendment cases dealing with compelled dues 
from nonunion employees, “[s]upport of a private association is fundamentally different from 
compelled support of government . . . . [T]he reason for permitting the government to compel the 
payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that the government is 
representative of the people. The same cannot be said of a union.” Abood, 431 U.S. at 258 n.13. 
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Yet the consistency that was exhibited by the Court’s 
conservatives in Knox and the health care case only deepens 
the mystery, because it suggests that these Justices are 
deeply committed to a principle that is not only difficult to 
justify, but upon scrutiny, not at all conservative: The 
principle that it is better (so far as the Constitution is 
concerned) for government to achieve its aims through 
government programs [like broadly based taxation and the 
direct provision of public services, all of which are 
constitutionally permissible] than to achieve them through 
the private sector and private organizations.
119
 
Moving beyond Sebelius, we see important connections between 
Knox and other major contemporaneous cases at the Court. Consider 
the mootness holding in Knox regarding the imperfect offer of a 
refund made by the union. Here the Knox majority concluded that 
“postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate a decision from 
review in this Court must be viewed with a critical eye.”
120
 This 
observation very well might have been calculated to send a message 
to litigants in the case that loomed over the 2012–2013 Term, the 
challenge to race-based affirmative action in Fisher v. University of 
Texas.
121
 The white plaintiff in Fisher (who was originally one of 
two plaintiffs but was the only one left by the time Supreme Court 
review was sought) unsuccessfully applied to the University of Texas 
at Austin (UT) for admission as a freshman.
122
 She then filed suit in 
federal court challenging UT’s race-based admissions criteria, but at 
the same time enrolled in another college.
123
 In her complaint, she 
asked for a declaratory judgment that UT’s race-based admissions 
policies violate the U.S. Constitution; an injunction directing UT to 
consider admitting her without regard to race (on the premise that 
she would transfer to UT if admitted); and money damages “in the 
form of” (rather than “including, but not limited to” or something 
similar to that formulation) a refund of her admissions application 
 
 119. Michael C. Dorf, How a Recent Supreme Court Case About Labor Unions 
Foreshadowed the Obamacare Ruling, JUSTIA (July 16, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/07/ 
16/how-a-recent-supreme-court-case-about-labor-unions-foreshadowed-the-obamacare-ruling. 
 120. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (citing City News & 
Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 283–84 (2001)). 
 121. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
 122. Id. at 217 n.3. 
 123. Id. 
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fee, on the theory that her application had not been processed fairly 
and therefore she was entitled to get her money back.
124
 But there 
was a big wrinkle. Because it took almost two years for Fisher’s case 
to be resolved by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
(which ruled in UT’s favor on the merits) and given that she was a 
senior at Louisiana State University at the time certiorari was 
granted, she was no longer interested in transferring to UT. 
Therefore, her claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were no 
longer live; in legal parlance, they were moot. But what about her 
small monetary refund claim (for a sum total of roughly $100)? In 
opposing Supreme Court review, UT asserted that if the Justices 
were to grant review, UT could simply offer to refund the $100, 
thereby mooting the damages claim as well.
125
 So, argued UT, it 
would be a waste of time for the Court to grant review, only to have 
to dismiss the case before deciding it.
126
 
The Court nonetheless granted review, and UT apparently never 
followed through on its threat to tender a refund. The university may 
have been waiting until Knox came down in the summer of 2012. In 
light of what the Court held in Knox, UT might have thought better 
of even trying to tender money in light of the Court’s reluctance to 
allow late-stage procedural maneuvering by one party to “insulate” 
alleged unconstitutional conduct from judicial review.
127
 
Finally, consider Knox alongside another blockbuster case of 
recent years—Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
128
 
Recall that in Citizens United, the Court freed not just corporations 
but also labor unions from regulations that limited their ability to 
spend money on national political campaigns.
129
 Some observers 
 
 124. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 2, Fisher, 
645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS), 2008 WL 7318510, at ¶ 101. 
 125. See Brief in Opposition at 21, Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (No. 11-345), 2011 WL 6146835, 
at *21. 
 126. Id. at *22. 
 127. For more analysis of this mootness issue and the ways the Court could deal with this 
kind of situation, see Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative 
Action Cases? Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77 (2012). 
 128. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 129. Although the Court in Citizens United focused on the question of whether it violates the 
First Amendment for the government to ban independent election expenditures by corporations, 
the majority’s opinion clearly applies with equal force to labor unions. The Court described at 
length and with approval earlier cases casting doubt on laws restricting the political expenditures 
of unions. See id. at 900–03. More important, the Court insisted that it was returning to the 
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may have expected that union money and corporate money would 
tend to counteract each other. But to the extent that Knox weakens 
public-sector unions (which make up a large percentage of all 
unions) by requiring opt-in versus opt-out procedures for 
nonchargeable expenses, and by conferring rights to would-be free 
riders to avoid paying even for chargeable offenses (if the Court 
should take those two steps it intimated), then the real-world 
meaning and effect of Citizens United could be altered in nontrivial 
ways. 
III.  ALVAREZ AND KNOX IN A 
LARGER FIRST AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE 
In both Knox and Alvarez, the First Amendment claimant won; 
the real question the Court grappled with in each case was how wide, 
doctrinally speaking, the victory should be.
130
 In Knox, the real 
division among the Justices is over how far beyond the narrow First 
Amendment win the Court should go in foreshadowing further 
victories for nonmembers who feel their expressive autonomy rights 
are being impinged by having their monetary contributions used in 
ways or by institutions with which they may disagree.
131
 And in 
Alvarez, the big question left unresolved is whether bans on even 
untruthful speech will be subject to (nearly always fatal) strict 
scrutiny on a categorical basis (as the plurality suggests), or instead 
whether particular regulations of certain kinds of untruthful speech 
will be subject to a more ad hoc—but nonetheless toothy—
intermediate scrutiny standard, as favored by the concurring 
Justices.
132
 
In this crucial, bottom-line “First Amendment-claimants-have-a-
good-chance-of-winning” way, 2011-2012 is far from an exceptional 
Term. For over two decades, expressive autonomy and the First 
Amendment’s Speech Clause have been the darlings of the Court. 
Numbers can help tell this remarkable story. Since 1992, the 
Supreme Court has invoked the Speech Clause to invalidate federal, 
state, or local laws and regulations in more than fifty cases, 
 
reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1972), which rejected the argument for expenditure 
limits for both unions and corporations. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909–12. 
 130. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion); Knox v. Serv. 
Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
 131. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277. 
 132. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (plurality opinion). 
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averaging close to three cases each year, a substantial number given 
the Court’s small yearly docket of between seventy and eighty cases 
for most of that period. But a quantitative inquiry tells only part of 
the story.
133
 We find it particularly noteworthy that First Amendment 
claims grounded in expressive autonomy rights are not simply 
winning but that they are prevailing over—and requiring significant 
sacrifices of—other values that traditionally have enjoyed high 
esteem in our legal, social, and constitutional traditions. Knox, for 
instance, thrusts aside the efficient functioning of labor unions—
important institutions in the nation’s economic and political 
development throughout the twentieth century—in favor of each 
individual nonmember’s maximal opportunity to avoid subsidizing 
potentially disagreeable political activity.
134
 As Justice Breyer’s 
dissent observes, the choice of opt-in over opt-out in the context of 
nonchargeable expenses (and the requirement of additional Hudson 
notices when any supplemental fees are imposed during a year) has 
significant implications for the level of resources public-sector 
unions will enjoy to pursue all of their activities.
135
 The Court was 
willing to sacrifice the interests on the union side of the balance 
without even seeking briefing on the practical effects of additional 
notice and the codification of opt-in procedures on union 
activities.
136
 More ominous still, for those who believe that unions 
perform valuable functions in our markets and our politics, is the 
Court’s intimation that nonmembers may be constitutionally entitled 
to avoid paying even chargeable fees.
137
 As noted earlier, such a 
regime would create a substantial free-rider problem, and produce 
potentially devastating damage to union finances.
138
 
 
 133. The exact number of Speech Clause invalidations depends upon whether one counts 
cases in which other constitutional provisions might also be invoked by the Court, among other 
factors, but the average of around three cases per Term, based on the authors’ review of all the 
cases handed down during the past two decades, is workable for these purposes. The Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review keeps a list of these cases on file. 
 134. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2288–99. 
 135. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 2299 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 137. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2288–99 (plurality opinion). 
 138. See Dorf, supra note 119 (“[S]uppose that the Supreme Court were eventually to rule 
that unions may not even charge non-members for collective bargaining activities. Any individual 
worker might then decide that it is not in his interest to join the union, because he will still benefit 
from whatever favorable terms the union negotiates. Let somebody else pay for it, the free rider 
says. . . . Free riding is not simply a fairness problem. Once enough people decide to free ride, the 
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In Alvarez, the U.S. military—another institution even more 
deeply embedded in American history than unions—loses in a case 
where the First Amendment challenger concedes that punishing him 
would not chill anyone else’s worthwhile speech.
139
 As Justice 
Alito’s dissent points out, the majority’s suggestion (both the 
plurality and the concurrence make this suggestion) that government 
counterspeech is the best way to deal with scoundrels like Mr. 
Alvarez and the damage he and those like him may do to military 
honor does not work in many instances, because the government may 
not have the information it needs to affirmatively compile and 
publicize lists of all recipients of military awards.
140
 And the 
plurality’s rejoinder that in such instances prosecution under the 
SVA would not help in any event
141
—because without verifiable 
information, prosecution is impossible—is logically flawed; there 
may be plenty of instances in which the government could prove that 
a person is lying about receipt of a military honor (say, by proving 
that the liar was in another line of work or in another country during 
the time he allegedly earned the honor), even if the government does 
not have enough information to proactively produce and post lists of 
all medal recipients during that time period. To the extent that 
criminal prosecution (or its threat) would decrease the incidence of 
individuals being able to “get away” with their lies, and thus reduce 
the dignitary harm caused to legitimate medal winners, the nontrivial 
costs to the military and the government of not having that tool 
available should be assigned some meaningful weight. 
To see the extent to which modern expressive autonomy has 
eclipsed these and other important values, we must look not just to 
this past year but also to recent years preceding it. Staying in the 
military context, Snyder v. Phelps,
142
 decided a year before Alvarez, 
illustrates another loss of military interests to free speech values. 
Indeed, the plurality in Alvarez began its analysis by observing that 
“[t]his is the second case in two Terms requiring the Court to 
consider speech that can disparage, or attempt to steal, honor that 
 
people who would otherwise be inclined to pay their fair share begin to feel like suckers; they too 
may refuse to pay; and the underlying collective good goes away.”). 
 139. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2563–64 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 2559–60. 
 141. Id. at 2550 (plurality opinion) (“[I]n cases where public refutation will not serve the 
Government’s interest, the Act will not either.”). 
 142. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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belongs to those who fought for this Nation in battle.”
143
 What the 
plurality did not mention here was that both times military interests 
were trumped by expressive autonomy.
144
 
We are not arguing that Snyder reached the wrong result; indeed 
we believe the case was correctly decided. But we do think that the 
Court did not discuss the competing values at stake in a way that will 
help it make good decisions in future cases when well-conceived 
efforts to protect military and other funeral mourners—the setting of 
Snyder—clash with the interests of protestors. 
In Snyder, the father of a marine killed in Iraq obtained a multi-
million dollar intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) jury 
verdict based on picketing—in three public locations not far from his 
son’s funeral—by members of the Westboro Baptist Church.
145
 The 
church members held up signs expressing messages such as “God 
Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t 
Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,” 
“You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.”
146
 The Court, by an 
8–1 vote (with Justice Alito dissenting), overturned the tort liability 
judgment in favor of the grieving father in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Roberts that provided free speech protection to the picketing 
in a “narrow” holding “limited by the particular facts before us.”
147
 
These controlling facts included the following: 
The church had notified the authorities in advance of 
its intent to picket at the time of the funeral, and the 
picketers complied with police instructions in staging their 
demonstration. The picketing took place within a 10–by 
25–foot plot of public land adjacent to a public street, 
behind a temporary fence . . . . That plot was approximately 
1,000 feet from the church where the funeral was held. 
Several buildings separated the picket site from the 
church . . . . The Westboro picketers displayed their signs 
for about 30 minutes before the funeral began and sang 
hymns and recited Bible verses. None of the picketers 
 
 143. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion). 
 144. See id.; Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1207. 
 145. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1214. 
 146. Id. at 1213. 
 147. Id. at 1220. 
  
Winter 2013] VORACIOUS FIRST AMENDMENT 521 
entered church property or went to the cemetery. They did 
not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence 
associated with the picketing . . . . 
The funeral procession passed within 200 to 300 feet of 
the picket site. Although Snyder [the father bringing suit] 
testified that he could see the tops of the picket signs as he 
drove to the funeral, he did not see what was written on the 
signs until later that night, while watching a news broadcast 
covering the event.
148
 
Under these circumstances, the Court rejected liability, 
observing that 
[w]hether the First Amendment prohibits holding 
Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on 
whether that speech is of public or private concern, as 
determined by all the circumstances of the case . . . . 
 . . . The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates 
to broad issues of interest to society at large, rather than 
matters of “purely private concern.” . . . While [the] 
messages [on the placards] may fall short of refined social 
or political commentary, the issues they highlight—the 
political and moral conduct of the United States and its 
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the 
military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are 
matters of public import.
149
 
We think the Court was wrong to focus on the question of 
whether the content of the picketers’ speech constituted a matter 
of public or private concern.
150
 Other factors should have been the 
focus of the Court’s explanation of its result. These factors 
include the location of the protests about one thousand feet from 
the funeral service.
151
 Relatedly, the protestors’ messages were not 
visible to the mourners when they entered or left the church where 
the service was held.
152
 The protestors complied with police 
directions as to where they could stand and hold their signs.
153
 The 
 
 148. Id. at 1213–14. 
 149. Id. at 1215–17. 
 150. See id. at 1215–19. 
 151. Id. at 1213. 
 152. See id. at 1213–14. 
 153. Id. at 1213. 
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protest was directed to the public at large.
154
 This was public 
discourse—it was not speech exclusively, or even primarily, 
directed at a target audience. 
Since all of these conditions concerning the protest were present, 
it is not clear that the question of whether their speech related to a 
matter of public or private concern should be relevant in this kind of 
a case. Assume a speaker strongly dislikes one of his colleagues at 
work. The speaker stands on a soapbox in a public park and states 
that his colleague is a horrible person who should be sent to hell 
when he dies. This is mean-spirited private speech, but as long as it 
is not defamatory we would think it is constitutionally protected—at 
least if it is addressed to a public audience and expressed in a 
location some distance away from the place where the maligned 
colleague lives and works. 
Now assume that Westboro Baptist Church members placed 
telephone calls to the home of parents of a soldier killed in the line of 
duty immediately before and after the funeral service for their son or 
daughter. Assume further that the church members expressed exactly 
the same messages that were depicted on the protestors’ signs at 
issue in the Snyder case—messages that the Supreme Court 
characterized as addressing matters of public concern. As we 
maintained in an earlier article, there is a strong argument that such 
phone calls could and should be sanctioned as telephone 
harassment.
155
 Similarly, the antiabortion messages communicated 
by residential picketers in Frisby v. Schultz
156
 were also considered 
speech on a matter of public concern.
157
 Yet the picketers’ expressive 
activity there could lawfully be restricted because it “inherently and 
offensively intrude[d] on residential privacy” and had a “devastating 
effect . . . on the quiet enjoyment of the home.”
158
 Thus, in particular 
cases, when, where, and how speech is communicated may be more 
 
 154. See id. at 1218 n.4 (“The fact that Westboro conducted its picketing adjacent to a public 
street does not insulate the speech from liability, but instead heightens concerns that what is at 
issue is an effort to communicate to the public the church’s views on matters of public concern. 
That is why our precedents so clearly recognize the special significance of this traditional public 
forum.”). 
 155. See Alan Brownstein & Vikram David Amar, Death, Grief, and Freedom of Speech: 
Does the First Amendment Permit Protection Against the Harassment and Commandeering of 
Funeral Mourners?, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 368, 380 (2010). 
 156. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
 157. Id. at 479. 
 158. Id. at 486. 
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important in determining whether the speech can be restricted or 
subject to penalty than is the determination that the speech is a matter 
of public or private concern. By emphasizing the military/public 
policy content of the speech, however, in explaining First 
Amendment protection in Snyder, the Court may have sent the wrong 
message to legislatures interested in pursuing reasonable time, place, 
and manner limits on funeral protestors; may have made lower courts 
less likely to see that such laws, even if they are applied to speech on 
matters of public concern, are permissible; and thus may have made 
it harder to vindicate the interests of the military and the mourners at 
funerals.
159
 
Military and mourner protections are far from the only recent 
victims of the expressive autonomy juggernaut. Antidiscrimination 
laws and norms have also fallen in the First Amendment’s path. The 
5–4 ruling in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
160
 is a prominent 
example. There, the Court upheld the expressive autonomy 
entitlement of the Boy Scouts to be exempt from a state law 
prohibiting public accommodation entities from discriminating on 
the basis of sexual orientation.
161
 Another important constitutional 
value—free and fair elections—has also come under pressure from 
the First Amendment.
162
 We speak here, of course, of the famous 
Citizens United ruling three years ago that we mentioned earlier, in 
which the Court vindicated the First Amendment rights of 
corporations (and labor unions, whose victory in Citizens United may 
be undermined by their loss in Knox)
163
 to expend unlimited amounts 
of money in support of candidates or causes in federal and state 
elections notwithstanding plausible concerns about corruption, the 
appearance of corruption, and the unfairness of the electoral playing 
 
 159. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218. The Snyder Court did observe that the protestors’ “choice 
of where and when to conduct [their] picketing is not beyond the Government’s regulatory 
reach—it is ‘subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions’ that are consistent with the 
standards announced in this Court’s precedents.” Id. But the Court went on to say that it had “no 
occasion to consider how [such a law] might apply to facts such as those before us,” suggesting 
that perhaps content-neutral time, place, and manner laws could proscribe the very conduct at 
issue in Snyder. Id. Both the wrong-headed suggestion and the related misplaced emphasis on the 
nature of the protestors’ message discourage sensible evolution of the First Amendment doctrine 
going forward. 
 160. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 161. Id. at 640. 
 162. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 163. See Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). 
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field.
164
 Nor is Citizens United the only recent case we have in mind 
when we say that electoral reform has often been a casualty brought 
down by First Amendment warriors. Consider Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club’s PAC v. Bennett,
165
 where the Court by a 5–4 vote 
(with Chief Justice Roberts writing a majority opinion for himself, 
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) invalidated an Arizona 
campaign finance law that increased the subsidy available to a 
publicly financed candidate based on the amount his self-financed 
opponent spent on her own behalf or the amount independent 
organizations spent supporting her.
166
 In some respects, increased use 
of publicly financed elections may be the remedy for what some 
people think are flaws in the regime Citizens United created. Placing 
hurdles in the path of public finance schemes may undermine the 
utility of this check on the excesses of privately funded political 
power permitted by Citizens United. 
Under the Arizona law at issue in Bennett, “candidates for state 
office who accept public financing could receive additional money 
from the state in direct response to the campaign activities of 
privately financed candidates and independent expenditure 
groups.”
167
 Once a candidate exceeded a set spending limit, a 
publicly financed candidate received roughly one dollar for every 
dollar spent by an opposing privately financed candidate, up to a 
predetermined ceiling.
168
 The publicly financed candidate also 
received, again up to a specified ceiling, roughly one dollar for every 
dollar spent by independent expenditure groups to support the 
privately financed candidate or to oppose the publicly financed 
candidate.
169
 The Court held that this funding scheme substantially 
burdened protected political speech by self-financed candidates and 
independent expenditure groups without serving a compelling state 
interest and therefore violated the First Amendment.
170
 
Although the speech of the self-financed candidates and 
independent expenditure groups was not directly capped or limited 
by Arizona’s matching funds provision, those parties contended that 
 
 164. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 881–82. 
 165. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 166. Id. at 2829. 
 167. Id. at 2831. 
 168. Id. at 2813. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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the law substantially burdened their political speech in the same way 
that speech was unconstitutionally burdened in Davis v. Federal 
Election Commission.
171
 In Davis, the Court struck down “a new, 
asymmetrical regulatory scheme” enacted by Congress providing 
that if a candidate for the United States House of Representatives 
spent more than $350,000 of personal funds on his or her electoral 
campaign, the candidate’s opponent would then be permitted to 
collect individual contributions up to $6,900 per contributor—three 
times the normal contribution limit of $2,300.
172
 The Court held that 
this scheme “burden[ed] [the self-funded candidate’s] exercise of his 
First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures of his 
personal funds because” doing so had “the effect of enabling his 
opponent to raise more money and to use that money to finance 
speech that counteract[ed] and thus diminishe[d] the effectiveness of 
[the self-funded candidate’s] own speech.”
173
 
The Bennett Court held that “the logic of Davis largely 
control[led]” the current case before it.
174
 Indeed, to the Court, the 
differences between Arizona’s regime and that regime struck down 
in Davis made the Arizona law worse. First, in Davis, unlike in 
Bennett, the opponent of the self-funded candidate was not 
guaranteed more money based on what the self-funded candidate 
spent—he merely had the opportunity to raise more money.
175
 
Moreover, under the Arizona law in Bennett, additional monies for 
an opponent were triggered by expenditures of third parties rather 
than just by the self-funded candidate himself, further increasing the 
burden on the self-funded candidate.
176
 The Court then rejected the 
two government rationales that were advanced as sufficiently 
compelling interests to justify any burden on expression—the 
leveling of the playing field among candidates and the desire to 
avoid corruption or its appearance.
177
 As to the former, the Court 
reiterated its position that equalizing the resources among candidates 
is not a permissible objective of campaign finance laws under the 
 
 171. Id. at 2817 (citing Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008)). 
 172. Davis, 554 U.S. at 729. 
 173. Id. at 736. 
 174. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2818. 
 175. Davis, 554 U.S. at 736, 738. 
 176. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 2818–21. 
 177. Id. at 2807. 
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First Amendment.
178
 And as to the latter, the Court noted that self-
expenditures and independent expenditures, unlike campaign 
contributions, do not raise the specter of corruption. 
Justice Kagan wrote a passionate dissent, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, in which she distinguished Davis 
from Bennett on the ground that it involved limits on the self-funded 
candidate’s ability to raise money himself, rather than increases in 
subsidies for the opponent.
179
 The full meaning of Bennett and Davis 
will, of course, depend on how the Court ultimately interprets them. 
One possible way to read the majority’s opinion in Bennett is that 
explicit, near dollar-for-dollar “matching” subsidies triggered by one 
candidate’s funding of political speech is hard to understand as 
anything other than an attempt to “level the playing field,” which has 
been held to be an impermissible goal under the First Amendment 
ever since Buckley v. Valeo.
180
 Under this reading, more nuanced 
public finance schemes that avoid the appearance of equalization and 
instead simply give publicly funded candidates an amount of money 
adequate to get their messages out, regardless of what others spend, 
will remain permissible. A second reading of Bennett is more 
ominous for advocates of public financing. Under this reading, the 
very essence of public financing schemes is attempted equalization. 
As such, all these schemes will increasingly be looked at by the 
Court with skepticism. 
Consider too another case from the last decade (outside the 
context of campaign finance) in which electoral regulation—and the 
power of states to experiment in our system of federalism—fell prey 
to an arguably overzealous application of free speech principles.
181
 In 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, five Justices used the First 
Amendment to strike down a Minnesota law that prohibited 
candidates for judicial office from speaking out on issues of the 
day.
182
 
The Minnesota law at issue in White prohibited a candidate for 
judicial office, whether an incumbent judge or a non-judge 
challenger, from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or 
 
 178. Id. at 2825–26. 
 179. Id. at 2839–41 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 180. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that equalizing the financial resources of the parties is not an 
acceptable justification for capping campaign expenditures). 
 181. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 182. Id. at 788. 
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political issues.”
183
 The prohibition went beyond candidate 
“promises” and forbade, for example, a candidate from criticizing a 
past court decision and indicating a willingness to consider a 
different result in similar cases down the road.
184
 Strong sanctions 
accompanied Minnesota’s prohibition.
185
 Judicial candidates who 
were sitting judges who violated the Minnesota ban were “subject to 
discipline, including removal, censure, civil penalties, and 
suspension without pay.”
186
 Lawyers who ran for judicial office and 
violated the rule were subject to, among other things, “disbarment, 
suspension, and probation” from the practice of law.
187
 
Minnesota argued that it needed to regulate candidate speech to 
ensure that the public believes that judges are sufficiently open 
minded about important matters that might come before them.
188
 
According to the Court, however, whatever gain in public confidence 
the Minnesota law achieved was inadequate to overcome the free 
speech interests of the candidates because it is “imperative that 
[candidates] be allowed to freely express themselves on matters of 
current public importance.”
189
 Justice Kennedy, whose concurrence 
took a similar route, added that an individual’s First Amendment 
rights are not surrendered simply because he has thrown his hat into 
the election ring.
190
 
The dissenting Justices’ approach was quite different. For them, 
this case was not so much about the First Amendment as it was about 
states’ rights—in particular, the freedom of states to structure their 
judicial selection procedures to promote judiciousness.
191
 Justice 
Stevens and the other dissenting Justices argued that judicial 
elections are not like other “political” elections, because “there is a 
critical difference between the work of the judge and the work of 
other public officials.”
192
 Judges must be, and must be perceived to 
be, impartial and free from politics in a way that legislative and 
executive officials are not. Because of this, states must not be put in 
 
 183. Id. at 768. 
 184. Id. at 772. 
 185. Id. at 768. 
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 188. Id. at 778–79. 
 189. See id. at 781–82 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 395 (1962)). 
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“an all or nothing choice of abandoning judicial elections or having 
elections in which anything goes.”
193
 
The majority and the dissent end up in very different places. If 
one embraces the majority’s reasoning, states are going to have a 
hard time discouraging judicial candidates from speaking their 
minds, however irresponsibly. Yet if one heeds the dissent, states 
will have a pretty free hand to deter people who want to criticize 
existing judicial rulings and doctrines—no matter the First 
Amendment costs this might entail. From where we sit, neither of 
these destinations seems very attractive. 
But there is another place to go—a place where both free speech 
and judicial impartiality can be protected, a place where the First and 
Tenth Amendments can peacefully coexist, and a place where both 
the centrality of anti-incumbent speech in an election and the right of 
a state to fill its judiciary with judicious people can be 
acknowledged. This middle path is based on two key thoughts. First, 
speakers should not be punished for core political and anti-
incumbent speech. Second, there is no First Amendment right to be a 
judge, and it is not unconstitutional punishment to be kept off the 
bench for injudicious speech. 
In a nutshell, the First Amendment protects one’s right to speak 
about the bench, but not to sit on it, and the Tenth Amendment gives 
states broad powers to structure state officeholding—especially 
judicial officeholding—but it does not give states free rein to censor 
and punish free-spirited critics and candidates. 
Begin with the second point: It is simply not a punishment that 
violates the First Amendment for a state to deny a person high public 
office because of the views he or she has expressed. This happens all 
the time in the executive branch under the (perfectly constitutional) 
system of patronage used to reward party loyalists with plum 
government posts.
194
 There is, in short, a First Amendment right to 
be a Democrat, but there is not a First Amendment right to be a 
Democrat in a Republican president’s cabinet. Consider also the 
selection of judges at the federal level, where the President and the 
Senate certainly, and permissibly, may refuse to make someone a 
judge because of what that person has said, even though such 
 
 193. Id. at 799–800. 
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refusals are undeniably “content-based” and indeed “viewpoint-
based,” and thus might, in other contexts, run afoul of basic First 
Amendment principles. A President is perfectly within his rights to 
withdraw a judicial nomination if the nominee says injudicious 
things. Thus, there is a right to say foolish things, but there is not a 
right to both say them and be nominated or confirmed despite them. 
If it is not a violation of the First Amendment (and it is surely 
not) for the Senate to pass an internal Senate rule saying it will not 
confirm to the federal bench anyone who has expressed racist views 
in public, then neither is it a violation of the First Amendment for the 
Senate to announce that it will not confirm any person who speaks 
out “injudiciously” about the current Supreme Court or any other 
issues of the day during the confirmation process. We are not saying 
the Senate can refuse to consider someone for a judgeship on any 
ground at all. The fact that a nominee is African American, for 
example, cannot be a disqualifying characteristic because of 
constitutional principles rooted in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, among other places. But the content and timing of the 
nominee’s expressed views surely can be taken into account without 
violating the First Amendment. 
A counterargument to our position might run as follows: In 
Minnesota, judges are selected not by the governor and state senate, 
but by the people in an election. Once Minnesota has turned over the 
process of picking judges from government institutions to the people 
themselves, the counterargument goes, then surely the state must 
allow the people to have access to all relevant information about the 
candidates. Perhaps—although pinning down the precise source and 
scope of this constitutional intuition is no easy matter. One possible 
elaboration might run like this: When a state decides to hold a true 
“election” to determine a contest, the voters in that election should 
not be constrained in doing their job, lest people be confused or 
deceived about what powers they are being given or denied. 
Avoiding voter confusion is a laudable objective, and, at some 
level, a constitutionally grounded one. But suppose Minnesota 
tweaked its process ever so slightly so as to avoid any possible 
deception or voter confusion. Suppose, for example, that the state 
made crystal clear that the vote of the people was not the final word 
but rather only, formally speaking, a strong opinion poll (a “beauty 
contest,” in election lingo) that a governmental agency—perhaps a 
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special committee of the state senate—should take into account in 
making the final decision about whom to appoint to the bench. 
Consistent with the Constitution, any state could cut the people out 
of the loop altogether and give judicial selection powers entirely to a 
governor and a senate who are free to take into account the views 
and statements of judicial applicants. Indeed, there is strong Supreme 
Court precedent suggesting such state choices are central to the 
Tenth Amendment and American federalism.
195
 Given that this is so, 
why should a state not be able to decide to involve the people, but 
with less finality? 
So long as the final decision is made on grounds (judiciousness) 
plainly relevant to the nature of the office (the judiciary), how is the 
Constitution violated by this popular “beauty contest” system? Note 
that there is no federal constitutional rule that the top vote-getter in a 
state judicial election must get the bench seat, the way there is, for 
example, a constitutional rule in the Seventeenth Amendment that 
the candidate who wins a majority of the statewide vote gets to be 
the U.S. Senator.
196
 
Popular-vote “beauty contests” may be unusual nowadays, but 
they are certainly not unheard of in American history. Before the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which provides for direct popular election 
of U.S. Senators,
197
 many states held “beauty contest” popular 
elections that were then used by the state legislatures in their 
decisions about whom to elect to the Senate.
198
 Similarly, in 
presidential “elections,” states in the early Republic were free to use 
popular-vote “beauty contests” to give the state legislatures 
information that legislators could then use to decide whom to send to 
the electoral college. And even today, a state could, without violating 
the First Amendment, prospectively legislate that it will award its 
electoral college votes to the winner of the popular vote in that state 
only if that “winner” has, say, participated in state-sponsored debates 
or refrained from endorsing racial segregation.
199
 This is so even 
though the First Amendment would forbid truly punishing someone 
 
 195. E.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
 196. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Vikram Amar, The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional 
Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 
100 GEO. L. J. 237, 237–38 (2011). 
 199. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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for boycotting a debate or for spewing racist rhetoric at an open 
political rally. In short, there is no ultrastrong First Amendment right 
to be a president. Or a judge. The right to speak does not encompass 
the right to hold either of these jobs. 
But isn’t there a presumptive right to ply one’s lawful private 
legal practice free from penalty for one’s anti-incumbent political 
expressions? And didn’t the Minnesota regime go too far when it 
threatened disbarment (and not just ineligibility for the bench) for 
any non-incumbent judicial candidate who speaks out too politically 
during the campaign? Surely it did, and this was the aspect of the 
Minnesota law that should have been stressed by the majority and 
was altogether missed by the dissent. When Minnesota not only 
denied high government jobs to intemperate speakers, but also 
threatened to take away their private livelihoods without clear 
evidence that they were unfit to hold those occupations, then the 
state’s actions became punitive in a way that the First Amendment 
prohibits. 
Allowing Minnesota to disbar lawyer critics of incumbent 
judges and existing judicial rulings would severely dampen core 
political discourse, whether we call the bench-filling process an 
“election,” a “selection,” or a “beauty contest.” Punishing private 
citizens for speaking out against existing laws and judges is precisely 
what the First Amendment is, at its core, designed to prevent. All of 
this suggests that if Minnesota passed legislation changing its 
election to a “beauty contest” and limiting the consequences of 
intemperate speech to judicial ineligibility, then the legislation 
should survive First Amendment attack. That much narrower 
approach should have been the one the Court took in White—and 
should, indeed, have commanded unanimity, as it satisfies the 
concerns of all nine Justices. Such an approach also would have 
provided a map for other states as they considered revising their own 
judicial selection procedures. 
Let us now turn to two other historically important values that 
have given way to expressive autonomy challenges in the last few 
years: (1) parental control over the upbringing of their children and 
(2) consumer protections. Regarding parental control, consider 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,
200
 where a somewhat 
 
 200. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
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divided Court
201
 invalidated a California statute that prohibited the 
sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors unless accompanied 
by a parent purchaser and required the packaging of “violent video 
games” to be labeled “18.”
202
 The California statute covered games 
“in which the range of options available to a player includes 
killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an 
image of a human being, if those acts are depicted” in a 
manner that “[a] reasonable person, considering the game as 
a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest 
of minors,” that is “patently offensive to prevailing 
standards in the community as to what is suitable for 
minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for 
minors.”
203
 
Observing that video games qualify for First Amendment 
protection, and drawing no meaningful distinction between speech 
for adults and speech for children outside the realm of sexual speech, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court recognized “that it is difficult 
to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”
204
 
Scalia went on to remind us that 
“as a general matter, . . . government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.” There are of course 
exceptions. “From 1791 to the present,” . . . the First 
Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the content of 
speech in a few limited areas,” and has never “include[d] a 
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.”
205
 
Justice Scalia then continued by noting that “without persuasive 
evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if 
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may 
not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied in the 
First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
 
 201. Five Justices joined the majority opinion and seven concurred in the ruling. 
 202. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2732. 
 203. Id. at 2732–33 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1) (West 2006)). 
 204. Id. at 2733. 
 205. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2009) (alterations in 
original)). 
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Government outweigh the costs.’”
206
 This principle, Justice Scalia 
argued, controlled the case at hand.
207
 
To our way of thinking, the Court in Brown, as in Snyder, may 
have reached a defensible result in the case at hand, but in doing so 
seemed to have fashioned some bad doctrinal principles. As we 
explained when we offered written analysis to California legislative 
staff while the video game bill was under consideration, California’s 
law reached too far. It is hard to argue, for First Amendment 
purposes or otherwise, that the state can (or should try to) prohibit a 
seventeen-year-old person planning to join the Marines when he 
turns eighteen from buying a violent video game unless his mother 
accompanies him to the store to purchase the game for him. The 
statute’s age cut-off was simply too high. 
The Court could have made that point succinctly and noted that 
a more carefully tailored law restricting access to violent video 
games to children under the age of thirteen or fourteen would have 
raised a very different case.
208
 Unfortunately, the Court did not go 
that route. Instead, it insisted that, with the exception of sexually 
graphic materials, children have pretty much the same free speech 
rights as adults.
209
 Thus, if adults may access depraved and viciously 
violent video games in which women and racial and religious 
minorities are slaughtered like animals,
210
 minors under the age of 
eighteen have the same freedom to obtain these materials. 
But this constitutional equivalence between adults and children 
is very much open to question. Children do not have the same rights 
as adults when it comes to voting, having abortions, marrying, or 
keeping and bearing arms.
211
 The reason children do not enjoy the 
full panoply of rights guaranteed to adults is that children lack the 
experience, maturity, and knowledge to decide how to responsibly 
exercise those freedoms.
212
 Why should the right to free speech be 
any different, particularly if legislation is properly directed at 
protecting young children? 
 
 206. Id. at 2734 (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (2011). 
 209. Id. at 2760–61. 
 210. Id. at 2749–50. 
 211. Id. at 2760. 
 212. Id. at 2767. 
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The Brown Court did not adequately answer this question. 
Instead, the Court cited language from one case, Erznoznik v. 
Jacksonville,
213
 to support the argument that children and adults have 
equivalent First Amendment rights.
214
 Yet, Erznoznik was 
distinguishable from Brown because it did not concern the narrow 
issue in Brown of marketing expressive materials to children. Rather, 
Erznoznik invalidated a law prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from 
showing movies containing nude scenes in order to prevent children 
from catching fleeting glimpses of nude images on the screen from 
afar.
215
 We agree with the holding in Erznoznik to the extent that it 
correctly recognized that the State cannot childproof the marketplace 
of ideas and cannot restrict free speech among adults simply because 
the speech might be overheard (or seen) by children. In contrast, 
California’s statute in Brown narrowly restricted the direct marketing 
of video games to children
216
 and did not impose limits on adults’ 
rights to purchase the violent video games for themselves or their 
children. 
We are not suggesting that determining the free speech rights of 
children and the rights of adults who target child audiences is a 
simple issue for the courts to resolve. Age matters, and there is a 
continuum of rights that grows along with a child’s maturity and 
experience. Courts will confront difficult questions about what falls 
within the scope of legislative discretion. While we may avoid those 
hard questions by providing children the same free speech rights as 
adults, avoiding these problems creates others in their place. Does 
the fact that Nazis can hold rallies on public streets mean they can 
patrol sidewalks in front of elementary schools and recruit children 
to attend their meetings? Justice Scalia points out in Brown that a 
seventeen-year-old can attend the church of his choice and that 
church groups have a free speech right to proselytize our youth.
217
 
Does that mean that any group that identifies itself as religious in 
nature can proselytize eight-year-olds and invite them to attend 
church meetings without their parents’ permission? 
 
 213. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
 214. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
(1975)). 
 215. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 223. 
 216. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746.1 (West 2006). 
 217. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 n.3. 
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As for consumer protection, consider the Court’s most important 
commercial speech case in recent years, Sorrell v. IMS Health, 
Inc.
218
 There, the Court (6–3, with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Kagan, dissenting) struck down a Vermont law restricting the sale, 
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing 
practices of individual doctors.
219
 Subject to certain exceptions, the 
Vermont statute prohibited such information from being sold, 
disclosed by pharmacies for marketing purposes, or used for 
marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
220
 Vermont argued that 
its prohibitions safeguarded medical privacy and diminished the 
likelihood that marketing would lead to prescription decisions that 
are adverse to the best interests of patients and the state.
221
 The Court 
assumed these interests were significant, but it held that Vermont’s 
statute must be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny because 
speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing is a form of expression 
protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
222
 The 
Court concluded the law did not satisfy that standard because of the 
imprecise fit between its means and asserted ends.
223
 
Free speech doctrine has been so ravenous in recent years that it 
is substantially cannibalizing other clauses in the First Amendment, 
particularly the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 
In a series of cases beginning with Widmar v. Vincent
224
 in 1981 and 
extending through Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District,
225
 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University 
of Virginia,
226
 and Good News Club v. Milford Central School,
227
 the 
Court used the Free Speech Clause to protect religious gatherings 
and activities from discrimination. Widmar characterized 
discrimination against expressive religious activities as content 
discrimination.
228
 In Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News 
Club, however, the Court more aggressively construed 
 
 218. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 219. Id. at 2658–59, 2672. 
 220. Id. at 2659. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 2668. 
 224. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 225. 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 226. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 227. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 228. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270. 
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discrimination against these activities as viewpoint discrimination.
229
 
In perhaps the most forceful assertion of Free Speech Clause 
dominance, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
230
 four dissenting 
Justices asserted that a university policy prohibiting both religious 
and secular student groups from discriminating on the basis of 
religion in admitting members, while permitting discrimination on 
the basis of political belief or affiliation, amounted to 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination against religion.
231
 
This line of authority displaces the Free Exercise Clause as the 
primary constitutional vehicle for protecting religious liberty and 
simultaneously undermines Establishment Clause constraints on 
government promotion of religion. Lamb’s Chapel and Good News 
Club, for example, involved discriminatory policies restricting 
religious groups’ access to public property for religiously expressive 
activities.
232
 Although Employment Division v. Smith,
233
 the seminal 
free exercise case decided in 1990, sharply limited the scope of free 
exercise rights against neutral laws of general applicability, it 
reaffirmed the viability of free exercise rights against laws targeting 
religion.
234
 Thus, the discriminatory policies at issue in Lamb’s 
Chapel and Good News Club were vulnerable to rigorous review and 
invalidation under free exercise doctrine, and the plaintiffs in both 
cases raised such claims in their lawsuits.
235
 Yet, in both Lamb’s 
Chapel and Good News, the Court ignored the constitutional 
guarantees focusing directly on the protection of religious liberty and 
 
 229. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831; Lamb’s Chapel, 
508 U.S. at 394. 
 230. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 231. Id. at 3009–10 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 232. In Lamb’s Chapel, the Court described the issue as follows: 
[W]hether, against this background of state law, it violates the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
deny a church access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and for 
assertedly religious purposes, a film series dealing with family and child-rearing issues 
faced by parents today. 
Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387. In Good News Club, a private Christian youth organization 
named the Good News Club was entitled to use public school facilities so long as the club 
received approval from the school. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103. The club’s sponsors 
requested permission to hold the club’s weekly meeting in the school’s cafeteria. Id. School 
policy prohibited use of the facilities “by any individual or organization for religious purposes,” 
and the superintendent denied the club’s request on the basis that the activity was equivalent to 
religious worship. Id. 
 233. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 104. 
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elected to resolve both cases on free speech grounds.
236
 Given the 
range of religious practice and activity with an expressive dimension 
(such as sermons, prayers, and proselytizing), substituting free 
speech for the free exercise of religion dramatically limits the scope 
of the latter provision. 
In contrast to Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club, the 
Rosenberger case did not involve restrictions on access to public 
property.
237
 At issue in Rosenberger was a university program that 
provided financial subsidies to student groups for various expressive 
activities.
238
 Here again, the university excluded funding for 
religiously expressive activities,
239
 and the Court concluded that the 
university’s policies were discriminatory on the basis of viewpoint 
and were therefore unconstitutional.
240
 This step—from 
discrimination against religion regarding access to public property to 
discrimination in eligibility for government subsidies—was arguably 
a substantial one, however. The Court does not typically apply 
rigorous review to government decisions to fund some speakers but 
not others.
241
 More importantly, the Establishment Clause imposes 
serious constraints on government funding of religious institutions 
and activities.
242
 If the Free Speech Clause were interpreted to 
prohibit such discrimination with respect to government funding, it 
would fundamentally undercut the key Establishment Clause goal of 
prohibiting the government from promoting religion. 
 
 236. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111. 
 237. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 843 (1995). 
 238. Id. at 824. 
 239. Id. at 824–27. 
 240. Id. at 835–37. 
 241. As the Court noted in a free speech subsidy case, Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983), it is hardly a “novel principle[]” to recognize that “a 
legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the 
right . . . .” The applicability of this principle to freedom of speech was reaffirmed in Rust v. 
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reasoning. “When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage 
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program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism or Fascism.” 
Id. at 193; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595–98 (1998) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (arguing that by denying some speakers subsidies provided to others, the 
government neither abridges nor suppresses freedom of speech). 
 242. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (“[T]he subject of religion is one in 
which both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views—in favor of free 
exercise, but opposed to establishment—that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or 
professions.”). 
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The Court’s use of the Free Speech Clause to bulldoze over and 
through the religion clauses may have serious costs, and it is unclear 
whether the Justices orchestrating this line of authority realize the 
doctrinal risks involved. The Free Speech Clause requires the same 
rigorous level of review of government regulations whether they 
favor or disfavor a particular viewpoint.
243
 Both forms of viewpoint 
discrimination are unconstitutional unless they can pass the Court’s 
strict scrutiny test.
244
 Accordingly, if laws discriminating against 
religiously expressive activities are subject to rigorous review, then 
laws discriminating in favor of religiously expressive activities must 
receive the same rigorous level of review. Such rigorous review 
would, however, undermine the constitutionality of numerous laws 
accommodating religious beliefs and activities, as well as those 
exempting religious individuals and institutions from general 
regulations that their secular counterparts are required to obey. 
The ramifications of the arguments offered by the dissenting 
Justices in the Martinez case are even more disturbing.
245
 If we are 
going to view religion through a free speech prism, rather than an 
equal protection framework, many conventional civil rights laws 
protecting religious individuals against discrimination may be 
vulnerable to constitutional challenge. From an equal protection 
perspective, religion is conceptualized as a person’s status or 
identity.
246
 Pursuant to this understanding, it is no more problematic 
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, but allow it on the 
basis of political belief or affiliation, than it is to prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of race but allow it on the basis of 
political belief and affiliation. 
The analysis changes dramatically, however, if we conceptualize 
religion as a viewpoint of speech under free speech doctrine. Now 
civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion 
but not discrimination on the basis of political belief or affiliation 
seem to be viewpoint discriminatory on their face. Individuals who 
hold and espouse religious beliefs are protected against 
 
 243. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983) (“[N]o case 
has applied any but the most exacting scrutiny to a content or speaker restriction that substantially 
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discrimination while individuals who hold and espouse nonreligious 
beliefs receive no comparable protection.
247
 Let us be clear that we 
are not arguing here that all such civil rights laws are 
unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause. We do suggest that 
there is a price to pay when free speech doctrine is expanded into 
domains that may be more appropriately reserved for analysis under 
doctrinal frameworks interpreting other constitutional provisions. 
To list some of the many important areas into which First 
Amendment doctrine has been extended and the many important 
societal and constitutional values over which free speech claims have 
prevailed is not to say the Supreme Court has decided all or any of 
these difficult disputes incorrectly. Nor is it to say this is the first 
time when one provision/theory in the Constitution seems to have 
ramified to influence and dominate over other provisions/theories. 
Indeed, we see in the modern free speech jurisprudence a 
development similar to that which could be said to characterize the 
extensive spread and reach of equal protection/antidiscrimination 
doctrine and theory during the decades following World War II.
248
 In 
that era, antidiscrimination norms and values derived from an equal 
protection foundation did more than simply govern racial 
discrimination cases; these norms and values deeply affected 
regulation of the electoral process,
249
 dictated the result in cases 
involving federal power to regulate the economy and protect 
consumers,
250
 drove state action doctrine,
251
 undergirded the right to 
travel,
252
 overrode associational interests,
253
 infiltrated establishment 
clause thinking,
254
 and indeed strongly influenced much of the 
doctrine developed under the Free Speech Clause,
255
 the provision 
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that in recent decades seems to have become the dominant 
constitutional paradigm. 
In terms of constitutional centrality and salience, the First 
Amendment in some ways is the new equal protection. 
 
 
grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing 
to express less favored or more controversial views.”). It is also interesting to note that the idea 
and label of “intermediate scrutiny” in content-neutral free speech regulation cases seems to have 
been borrowed from equal protection gender classification review. 
